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 Non-Technical Summary 
 
The last two decades have not only been an era of increasing international mobility 
of goods, services and factors but also one of a decreasing regulatory burden in a 
number of markets. Given these parallel trends the question on the nature of this cor-
relation arises: Is it a mere coincidence or does it represent some kind of causal link 
between globalization and deregulation? 
This analysis intends to provide for a better understanding of these issues through a 
thorough empirical analysis on the basis of an OECD country panel for the period 
1975 until 2000.  The study is also to contribute to the small but growing empirical 
literature on the determinants of structural reforms. Regulatory change is a particular 
sub-type of structural reform which can also target at, e.g., the monetary regime, the 
tax system or the size and structure of the government sector. This literature has 
been motivated by desire to explain why industrial countries show very different 
speeds of adjusting their structures to new circumstances which are related to in-
creasing global competition but also to internal changes resulting from the demo-
graphic change. 
The empirical analysis makes use of recently collected regulation indicators for four 
policy fields: financial market, product markets, labour markets and trade. After a 
short discussion of the link between globalization and deregulation and a descriptive 
view at the correlations, a panel analysis for OECD countries for the period 1975 to 
2001 is executed. The evidence shows that globalization in the narrow sense of trade 
openness and capital mobility has a rather limited impact as an immediate driver of 
deregulation. However, in a wider sense globalization definitions also comprise the 
easier flow of knowledge and information across borders resulting in more effective 
cross-border learning processes.  
The results hint to the empirical relevance of these cross-border learning aspects of 
globalization at least on fields like product and financial markets. Labour market 
 regulation is a notable exception: Here, neither deregulation nor convergence nor 
cross-border learning has taken place in the covered period. The findings on labour 
market regulation are compatible with the compensation hypothesis: Globalization 
may have increased the political-economic demand for job insider protection and 
unemployment benefits. 
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Abstract  
This paper treats the question to what extent globalization trends restrict a country-
specific regulation policy in industrial countries. The empirical analysis makes use 
of recently collected regulation indicators for four policy fields: financial market, 
product markets, labour markets and trade. After a short discussion of the link be-
tween globalization and deregulation and a descriptive view at the correlations, a 
panel analysis for OECD countries for the period 1975 to 2001 is executed. The evi-
dence shows that globalization in the narrow sense of trade openness and capital 
mobility has a rather limited impact as an immediate driver of deregulation. How-
ever, in a wider sense globalization definitions also comprise the easier flow of 
knowledge and information across borders resulting in more effective cross-border 
learning processes.  
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1 Introduction 
The last two decades have not only been an era of increasing international mobility 
of goods, services and factors but also one of decreasing regulatory burden in a 
number of markets. Given these parallel trends the question on the nature of this cor-
relation arises: Is it a mere coincidence or does it represent some kind of causal link 
between globalization and deregulation? Of course, for certain interdependencies the 
answer is trivial: Deregulation of international transactions directly causes or at least 
amplifies globalization trends. However, the opposite causal link from globalization 
towards regulatory decisions is less straightforward. It is not clear a priori, whether, 
how and to which extent increasing cross-border factor mobility will impact on 
regulatory equilibria – be it on the fields of labour, financial market, trade or product 
regulation.  
Thus, the guiding question of this study is to which extent globalization limits the 
national leeway for country-specific regulatory solutions. This issue is a neglected 
dimension of the globalization debate. Compared to fiscal policy in general (see 
Vaubel, 2005, for a recent update of references) and tax policy in particular (see the 
survey of Schulze and Ursprung, 1999) the issue of regulatory sovereignty in a glob-
alising environment has attracted much less attention in the academic literature. This 
may be partially explainable from data reasons since it is more difficult to quantify 
regulatory changes compared to changes in government expenditures or revenues. 
However, conceptually both fields are closely connected: Both explicit transfers 
through government spending and implicit transfers through regulation may serve 
the same political-economic purpose of favouring specific interest groups. In this 
sense, government spending and regulation can be substitutes. Therefore, it is 
equally desirable to study the consequences of increasing factor mobility for gov-
ernment activity both on the fiscal and the regulatory field.    
This analysis intends to provide for a better understanding of these issues through a 
thorough empirical analysis on the basis of an OECD country panel for the period 
1975 until 2000.  The study is also to contribute to the small but growing empirical 
literature on the determinants of structural reforms. Regulatory change is a particular 
sub-type of structural reform which can also target at, e.g., the monetary regime, the 
tax system or the size and structure of the government sector. This literature has 
been motivated by desire to explain why industrial countries show very different 
speeds of adjusting their structures to new circumstances which are related to in-
creasing global competition but also to internal changes resulting from the demo-
graphic change.  
In the literature on structural reforms, case studies with a focus on developing coun-
tries used to dominate (see Rodrik, 1996 for a by now somewhat out-dated survey of 
this literature). Examples for more recent and more comprising panel analyses are 
Pitlik and Wirth (2003) and Heinemann (2004) who make use of economic freedom 
 2
indicators as proxies for structural change and analyze the relevant drivers for large 
global country panels. In their panel analysis for 35 countries, Abiad and Mody 
(2003) focus on financial market deregulation and, therefore, are already closer to 
the regulation focus. The authors find a positive impact of trade openness on the 
pace of deregulation. Although some robust results originate from these studies - for 
example, the fact that deep economic crises tend to increase the likelihood of struc-
tural reforms -, they do not account for the enormous economic and political hetero-
geneity among countries of very different income classes and constitutional situa-
tions and, therefore, are only of limited use to learn much about the drivers of de-
regulation in industrial and democratic countries. 
An analysis more concentrated both on the conditions in industrial countries and de-
regulation is Helbling et al. (2004) whose approach is followed here both with re-
gard to the underlying data set and the basic model. In particular, we use the same 
time series on four regulatory fields: regulation of financial markets, product mar-
kets, labour markets and international trade. However, our study addresses the short-
comings of Helbling et al. (2004) which - in the light of our guiding question - is the 
rather simple approximation of the globalization trend by the trade openness variable 
which only measures one dimension of increasing internationalisation and neglects 
both capital and labour mobility. Furthermore, among the institutional variables this 
study does not take account of a possible impact of internal domestic political com-
petition related to federalism.  
The study proceeds in the following way: In section 2, we summarize a number of 
theoretical arguments relevant for the impact of globalization on regulation. In sec-
tion 3, a brief descriptive glance at our regulatory indicators and globalization meas-
ures is presented. Section 4 presents our model specification and panel regressions 
followed by the conclusions. 
2 Globalization and regulation – an overview of arguments 
and determinants 
Depending on the regulatory context there are very different and often counteracting 
arguments how globalization should influence regulation. 
The diversity of arguments originates from the fact that both globalization and regu-
lation have many facets. In its narrow economic definition, “globalization” describes 
the trend that national borders tend to lose their significance as a relevant obstacle to 
economic transactions or – more technically speaking – the occurrence of “a reduc-
tion in international arbitrage costs” (Schulze and Ursprung, 1999, p. 301). How-
ever, there are additional aspects related to the exchange of information and the de-
gree of political competition. The costs of voters getting informed about the condi-
tions beyond their home countries’ borders through the media or to physical travel-
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ling have come down – a fact which could contribute to an intensification of the 
yardstick competition phenomenon (Besley and Case, 1995) according to which the 
performance of a government is assessed relative to the performance of some 
(neighbouring) benchmark.  
It is helpful to organize the relevant arguments in the logic of the Stigler-Peltzman 
model of regulation (see Mueller, 1989, for a survey). Politicians with regulative 
power face a trade-off: Increasing, e.g., regulated prices they win political support 
from the benefiting companies whereas they lose support from consumers. This 
trade-off between the interests of winners and loser of regulation is a typical feature 
independent of the specific regulatory context. Consequently, given the vote maxi-
misation hypothesis, a political-economic equilibrium results where marginal gains 
in votes are equilibrated to marginal losses. The equilibria depend on many features 
of policy field such as: the existence of well-organised interest groups representing 
winners and/or losers, their voting and campaign financing power, the extent, distri-
bution and perceptibility of regulation costs and benefits, the level of voters’ infor-
mation or external restrictions. 
All these features can be influenced by increasing globalization rendering the closed 
country regulation equilibrium instable. The following arguments hint towards the 
deregulative power of globalization: 
– The media dimension of globalization, but also people’s increasing professional 
or holiday mobility make it easier for voters to learn from comparisons with 
other countries about the costs of regulation. This increases the relative power 
of those who usually pay the price of regulation without being fully aware of 
this due to regulation’s intransparent character. In this sense, globalization 
should improve the pre-conditions for cross-border learning. 
– The political benefits of regulation which lays the burden on increasingly mo-
bile factors like capital (or high-income individuals) tend to shrink. In the ex-
treme, mobility might simply render certain regulations ineffective – a phe-
nomenon relevant for some types of financial market regulation (for example, 
interest rate regulation would no longer be effective given the degree of finan-
cial capital mobility on current financial markets).  
– The beneficiaries of regulation at product markets which are, on the national 
level, often homogeneous, limited in number and therefore capable of organis-
ing their interests according to Olson’s (1965) theory of interest groups, might 
not be able to organize internationally. Thus, they would not be able to estab-
lish a similar political power on an international level even if on this level po-
litical suppliers of regulation exist – as it is the case for the European Union. 
On the national level, producer groups that used to have significant political in-
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fluence in a protected market might lose this influence once foreign producers 
enter the market and start to articulate their differential interests. 
However, globalization might not necessarily work exclusively towards deregula-
tion. Under certain conditions it might increase the benefit of specific types of regu-
lation and then even lead to new regulative initiatives. This is the case if increasing 
factor mobility creates new risks for the economy as a whole or at least for an influ-
ential interest group. 
This could be particularly relevant in the context of labour market regulation. On the 
one hand, increasing capital mobility puts inefficient solutions under pressure 
through raising structural unemployment in heavily regulated labour markets as it is 
notoriously the case for labour markets in the larger continental European countries. 
In this sense, globalization has increased the marginal costs of labour market regula-
tion and pushes towards deregulation. 
On the other hand, the political marginal benefit of labour market regulation might 
increase if globalization increases business cycle volatility and/or structural change 
inducing job insiders to demand a larger level of job protection as a compensation 
for accepting trade liberalization. This reasoning is analogous to the debate on the 
link between globalization and the size of government and social spending. Rodrik 
has postulated the compensation hypothesis according to which increasing social 
spending is the price that has to be paid to make voters accept internationalisation of 
their economies (Rodrik 1998, see Vaubel (2000) for a survey on the literature and 
an empirical assessment). 
Recently, Vaubel (2005) has proposed an alternative to Rodrik’s compensation hy-
pothesis with fundamentally different policy conclusions: He argues that the correla-
tion between openness and social spending is not the outcome of an ex ante compen-
sation deal but reflects the following chain of causality: Countries with inflexible 
labour markets experience an increase in structural unemployment with increasing 
openness. Subsequently, governments use part of the welfare gains of increasing in-
ternational trade to extend social spending. With this perspective, a compensation of 
labour is not a necessary precondition to buy acceptance for globalization but rather 
reflects the inability of some countries to increase labour market flexibility. 
Regulatory implicit transfers can be a substitute for explicit fiscal transfers. Hence, 
whatever the true structures behind the link between social spending and augmented 
cross-border trade, they point to the fact that at least in the case of labour market 
regulation there can be countervailing forces pressing for even more regulation with 
globalization.  
Assessing the impact of globalization on regulation should take account of further 
mechanism driving the acceptability of structural reforms (see Heinemann, 2004, 
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and Helbling et al, 2004). One insight from this literature is that a shock which 
forces the modest adjustment of the institutional status quo in the first step can be a 
trigger of more fundamental change. The “status quo bias” is empirically well 
proven in behavioural economics experiments: It describes a situation where people 
have a preference for one option among many others only because this option hap-
pens to be the status quo (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). If a minor change oc-
curs this specific option loses attraction immediately. The implication for reforms is 
that a small shock could overcome psychological resistance to more radical changes 
since it opens the way for a less biased reflection on optimum institutional solutions. 
This argument of small initial changes followed by speeding up more far-reaching 
deregulation can also be based on learning about the true distributional conse-
quences of deregulation. The pre-reform unknown identity of winners and losers of 
institutional change is one of the classical explanations for resistance to welfare im-
proving reforms (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). Even small first deregulation steps 
might help to identify the winners and losers and thus contribute to reduce uncer-
tainty (Abiad and Mody, 2003). If this turns out to be empirical relevant, small steps 
matter and deregulation can be self-accelerating. 
The phenomenon of the status quo bias is also closely linked to the observation that 
crisis often appears to be a pre-condition for reforms. A general feeling of crisis can 
open the window of opportunity for change since the status quo is then regarded as 
being non-sustainable. Globalization pressure can contribute to this sense of crisis. 
The literature on determinants of structural reforms cited above hints to the follow-
ing further economic and political determinants which can be relevant for structural 
changes in general and the speed of deregulation in particular: 
– General economic conditions: In line with the crisis hypothesis, the general 
economic situation measured on the basis of standard variables like growth, 
budget deficits, inflation or unemployment should matter with bad data increas-
ing the likelihood of deregulation.  
– Ideology: Governments of different ideologies typically also have different 
views at the desirable extent of regulatory involvement. These views should in-
fluence outcomes only if globalization leaves any leeway. In this sense, testing 
the relevance of ideology is also a test with regard to the political leeway that 
remains under globalization. 
– Decentralization of government: Internal competition between autonomous re-
gions could accelerate structural adjustments. 
– Strength of governments: A strong and stable government should be better able 
to carry out reforms. 
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– Election cycle: Post election years are often windows of opportunity for institu-
tional change - due to the relatively long time horizon the newly elected (or re-
elected) government faces. Government being newly elected regularly are in an 
ever better position for larger changes due to the “honeymoon effect”, an initial 
bonus of confidence, the fresh government normally experiences in the polls. 
– External restrictions: EU, IMF or WTO membership offer examples of external 
restrictions a country can face defining its regulatory policies. In an empirical 
study on OECD countries only the EU dummy offers sufficient cross-section 
variability for testing. 
3 Regulation and globalization: the experience since the mid-
seventies 
Our time series on the restrictiveness on government regulation of trade and of 
product, labour and financial markets originate from the data collection used in the 
World Economic Outlook (WEO) 2004 (Helbling et al., 2004, Appendix 3.1. for de-
tails on sources and construction). The 21 OECD countries covered are: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Ja-
pan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States (in the econometric analysis, Japan and Greece 
drop out due to missing control variables). The time series start in 1975 and, cur-
rently, extent to 1998 for labour and product markets, to 2001 for financial markets 
and to 2002 for trade. 
All indicators are normalized to range from 0 to 1 where an increasing value signals 
a declining degree of restriction. The first three indicators are calculated as an un-
weighted average of sector-specific indicators depicting different dimension of regu-
latory intervention. 
The regulation indicator for the financial sector (WEOFINANCIAL) takes account 
of the existence of credit controls, interest rate controls and restrictions on interna-
tional financial transactions. Thus, this indicator does not include regulatory issues 
linked to reporting and financial stability oriented monitoring of the financial sector 
which, certainly, would show very different time trends.  
The labour market indicator (WEOLABOR) is constructed on the basis of the Labor 
Market Institutions Database developed by Nickel and Nunziata (2001) and is the 
aggregate of sub-indicators on employment protection, benefit replacement rates and 
benefit duration. It excludes information on wage centralization since, for numerous 
countries, there is no time variance for related variables. 
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The product market indicator (WEOPRODUCT) was constructed by Nicoletti and 
Scarpetta (2003) and combines indicators on barriers to entry, public ownership, 
market structure, vertical integration of networks and final consumer services, and 
price controls for the following non-manufacturing sectors: gas, electricity, post, 
telecommunications, passenger air transport, railways and road freights. It thus cov-
ers the sectors which used to be characterised by heavy government involvement 
and protected monopolies/oligopolies in the past. 
Finally, the trade related indicator (WEOTRADE) is constructed on the basis of ef-
fective tariffs relating revenues from customs and import duties to the value of im-
ports. It should be noted that this indicator does not account for non-tariff obstacles 
to trade. 
Figure 1 summarizes the cross-section distribution of these indicators over time.1 
The first striking observation is that the labour market regulation trend differs fun-
damentally from the other markets. Whereas the years between 1975 and the end of 
the nineties have brought massive dismantling of regulatory limitations for financial 
transactions, activities on formerly protected service markets and obstacles to cross-
border trade, the same period is characterised by an initial increase of regulatory 
standards on labour markets and stagnation in the later years. 
Clear differences are observable among the deregulation fields, too. Product market 
deregulation took off later compared to financial and trade deregulation. As a conse-
quence product markets are still distant from being fully liberalised towards the end 
of the covered period. Cross-country convergence occurred most clearly for finan-
cial and trade regulatory standards where industrial countries in the light of the em-
ployed indictors have almost completely and jointly overcome regulatory obstacles. 
 
 
                                           
1   Note that, on the basis of the Economic Freedom of the World Indicator, David Henderson in 
his subsequent comment arrives at a very similar description of deregulation trends. 
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Figure 1: Regulation indicators selected OECD countries 
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Data source: Helbling et al. (2004), included are the OECD countries as listed at beginning of sec-
tion 3. 
Turning now to the measurement of globalization we focus on measures for mobility 
of goods, services, capital and people. Figure 2 depicts the time series (the first three 
in % of GDP) for trade openness (sum of exports and imports of goods and ser-
vices), the gross private capital flows (sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, 
and other investment inflows and outflows), foreign direct investment on its own 
(which is also included in the former) and finally as a very rough proxy for the mo-
bility of people: the share of foreign population in total population (sources for all 
globalization measures: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators). The 
share of foreign population variable does not offer full time series for the common 
sample for a number of non-European countries.  
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Figure 2: Globalization indicators for OECD countries 
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Data source: World Development Indicators, included are the OECD countries as listed at begin-
ning of section 3; smaller coverage for foreign population (no full time series for Australia, Can-
ada, France, New Zealand, Portugal, United States, therefore included from calculation of distribu-
tion). 
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All four time series show that the decades since the seventies have been an era of a 
more or less constant increase in cross-border transactions and mobility of people. 
Acceleration took place after the mid-nineties with strongly increasing mobility of 
real and financial capital.  
While the glance at Figures 1 and 2 justifies the general remark that the period since 
1975 has been an era of parallel deregulation and globalization, a more detailed cor-
relation analysis (see Table 1) reveals more differentiated insights.  
The financial regulation indicator has the least ambiguous correlation profile being 
significantly positively correlated to all globalization indicators. Labour regulation 
turns out to be the opposite and a-typical deregulation case since it is negatively cor-
related to all globalization measures with the exception of foreign population – a 
finding corresponding to the compensation hypothesis or its variants as discussed 
above. A further remarkable result is the negative correlation between the product 
market regulation indicator and trade openness. 
A look at the correlation among the different fields of regulation reveals that there is 
only one significant negative correlation which is the one between labour and trade 
regulation - a finding which hints toward the possibility that more aggressive protec-
tion of job insiders and more generous unemployment benefits are the prices that 
have to be paid in political-economic bargaining for the impact of trade liberaliza-
tion on labour markets. 
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Table 1: Cross correlations: indicators of regulation and globalization 
   WEOFINANCIAL WEOLABOR WEOPRODUCT WEOTRADE FDI 
FOREIGN 
POP. TRADE 
CAPITAL 
FLOWS 
WEOFINANCIAL Pearson correlation 1.00  
 two-sided p-value   
 N 540  
WEOLABOR Pearson correlation 0.05 1.00  
 two-sided p-value 0.24   
 N 477 477  
WEOPRODUCT Pearson correlation 0.55 0.28 1.00  
 two-sided p-value 0.00 0.00   
 N 480 477 504  
WEOTRADE Pearson correlation 0.33 -0.19 -0.05 1.00  
 two-sided p-value 0.00 0.00 0.31   
 N 540 477 480 556  
FDI Pearson correlation 0.38 -0.13 0.40 0.25 1.00  
 two-sided p-value 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00   
 N 500 457 482 500 611  
FOREIGN POP. Pearson correlation 0.36 0.18 0.26 -0.21 0.07 1.00  
 two-sided p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26   
 N 276 237 240 276 276 293  
TRADE Pearson correlation 0.20 -0.42 -0.18 0.46 0.38 0.58 1.00  
 two-sided p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
 N 536 477 504 536 611 293 933  
CAPITAL FLOWS Pearson correlation 0.37 -0.08 0.30 0.35 0.80 0.04 0.52 1.00 
 two-sided p-value 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.00  
 N 512 469 494 512 611 276 623 623 
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Table 2: Cross correlations: indicators of fiscal (revenue) decentralization and regulation 
   DRD1 DRD3 
DRD1 Pearson correlation 1  
 two-sided p-value  
 N 438  
DRD3 Pearson correlation 0.86 1.00 
 two-sided p-value 0.00  
 N 438 438 
WEOTRADE Pearson correlation -0.04 0.03 
 two-sided p-value 0.42 0.54 
 N 396 396 
WEOPRODUCT Pearson correlation 0.33 0.25 
 two-sided p-value 0.00 0.00 
 N 379 379 
WEOLABOR Pearson correlation 0.56 0.39 
 two-sided p-value 0.00 0.00 
 N 376 376 
WEOFINANCIAL Pearson correlation 0.22 0.27 
 two-sided p-value 0.00 0.00 
 N 396 396 
 
Relevant restrictions for regulatory equilibria need not in every case to be of an ex-
ternal nature. The existence of federal structures is an internal restriction which can 
have an impact on regulatory outcomes as well. Regions with certain fiscal or regu-
latory competencies might allow for elements of locational competition putting 
some pressure on inefficient regulatory burdens.  
In order to test for the relevance of decentralized structures we make use of the data 
set on revenue decentralization provided by Stegarescu (2004). Compared to simple 
dummies for the existence of autonomous regions (as provided, for example by the 
World Bank Database on Political Institutions) these indicators offer the advantage 
to be of a continuous and, thus, more differentiated nature. Stegarescu offers a set of 
decentralization indicators based on the share of revenues assigned to regions. While 
Stegarescu’s indicator “degree of revenue decentralization 3” (DRD3) simply meas-
ures the share of total government revenue assigned to the regions, the variable “de-
gree of revenue decentralization 1” (DRD 1) only includes revenue sources over 
which sub-central governments possess significant control in the sense that they 
control at least the tax base or the tax rate. For countries like Germany with a large 
importance of shared taxes which cannot be autonomously controlled by the federal 
countries, DRD1 is considerably smaller than DRD3. It must be conceded that the 
aspect of tax autonomy is not identical to the aspect of regulatory autonomy. How-
ever, we simply employ the indicator as a proxy for federal autonomy in a more 
general sense. 
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Table 2 depicts correlation coefficients among decentralization and regulation indi-
cators.  Both (highly correlated) decentralization indicators are positively and sig-
nificantly correlated with the regulation indicators with the exception of trade regu-
lation. This means that more centralized countries tend to have more regulated prod-
uct, labour and financial markets. 
4 Specification and results 
In the following, a dynamic model for the path of deregulation is estimated. The 
specification follows the model developed by Abiad and Mody (2003) and applied 
by Helbling et al. (2004). It allows for the path of regulation to be driven by a steady 
convergence of regulation to some “optimum” level of regulation REG*i,t . On the 
basis of the Stigler view at regulation this “optimum” should not be understood as a 
welfare maximizing solution but simply as the stable political-economic equilibrium 
level of regulation. In line with the definition of our regulatory indicators, larger lev-
els of REG are associated with less restrictive regulatory regimes. 
(1) titititi REGREGREG ,1,
*
,, )( εμ +−=Δ −  
If the status quo bias is relevant the values of μ  should be below 1. This parameter 
of institutional stickiness is assumed to depend on the strictness of current regula-
tion: 
(2) 1, −= tiREGkμ  
Thus, this specification allows for learning following the arguments discussed in 
section 2: Deregulative steps can be helpful to limit uncertainty about the outcomes 
of deregulation. 
Furthermore, this basic adjustment process is driven by further determinants includ-
ing some element of yardstick competition where the distance to the regulatory 
situation of the benchmark group (REGBM) has an impact on the country’s deregula-
tion path. This results in the following testable specification: 
(3)
ti
K
k tikkti
BM
titititi xREGREGREGREGREG ,1 ,,1,1,3
2
1,21,1, )( εβααα ++−++=Δ ∑ =−−−−
 
In (3) the coefficient α3 measures the impact of yardstick competition and the β-
coefficients the influence of the further control variables including most of the above 
described globalization and decentralization variables. 
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By construction, α1=k*REG*i,t-1  and is expected to be positive, whereas α2= - k 
would be negative if the status quo bias really loses power due to learning from de-
regulation. From this reduced form, the implicit “optimum” level of regulation 
equals α1/(-α2). 
For the estimation the following definitions and variables are used (see appendix for 
data sources): 
For the benchmark level of regulation it is assumed that for European OECD coun-
tries the EU average is the relevant yardstick and the USA regulation level for other 
OECD countries. In this sense, our yardstick test is not one of mimicking the 
neighbours, but rather one of following more general international trends. 
As proxies of crisis we make use of growth of real GDP and CPI inflation. We also 
experimented with unemployment which turned out to be mostly insignificant. 
To control for the impact of the ideological orientation of government a dummy 
variable is constructed on the basis of the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et 
al., 2001) variable on the ideological orientation of chief executive’s party. From the 
same database we also tested a number of indicators related to the stability of the 
government, ideological polarization in the parliament and the electoral cycle (elec-
tion year dummy, years left in current term, change in government to measure the 
extent of “honeymoon effect”). However, these turned out to be largely insignificant 
and have therefore not been included in the presented final specifications. 
Among the globalization indicators depicted in the descriptive analysis above, for-
eign population has to be dropped from the regressions due to too many missing 
values. Since the joint inclusion of the correlated indicators on trade and capital mo-
bility would be confronted with multicollinearity problems, a principal component 
of the three series is calculated and employed as the baseline mobility variable (be-
ing negatively correlated to increasing levels of mobility). 
With regard to the decentralization indicators, the final specification includes DRD3 
which performed better than its alternatives from Stegarescu (2004). 
Time and period fixed effects are included in the regressions depending on their 
joint significance. In order to limit problems of reversed causation (particularly rele-
vant for trade and capital mobility) sensitive explanatory variables are lagged by one 
year. For the coefficient tests, White covariances are used which are robust to vari-
ances differing among cross-sections and periods. 
Fixed effects estimations including the lagged dependent variable among the regres-
sors face a problem of biased coefficients. The error term is correlated with the 
transformed values of the lagged dependent variable where each cross section’s av-
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erage is subtracted from each observation. Microeconometric regressions where T is 
normally small deal with this difficulty by applying GMM-techniques along the 
lines suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). However, Attanasio et al. (2000) have 
shown that an uncritical application is not always the best solution for country pan-
els with a sufficiently large T. The problem is that instrumental-variable GMM ap-
proaches tend to produce imprecise estimates. Thus, there is a trade-off between the 
lack of precision with GMM estimates and the bias associated with the OLS ap-
proach. Attanasio et al. (2000) recommend to opt for the OLS approach “when T is 
big enough”. The length of our time series dimension (up to 27 years are included 
for some countries) hints towards a bias of only a limited scale and, hence, favours 
the straight regression option which is applied in the following.  
Tables 3 to 6 summarize the regression results. The estimation period is 1975 up to 
2001 with relatively few observations in the years 2000 and 2001. There are sub-
stantial differences in dynamics between regulation fields. Deregulation appears to 
be self-enforcing in the case of financial and product market deregulation. Here, 
learning about deregulation’s consequences after first deregulation steps, obviously 
helps to overcome resistance towards further dismantling of restrictions. For both 
fields, the speed of deregulation follows a reversed U-shape: Initially, learning ef-
fects speed up the process whereas later the closing gap towards the preferred level 
reduces the speed until the regulatory level has reached its equilibrium. The pattern 
for trade deregulation is different: it is characterized by classical steady convergence 
where an initial situation of high regulation tends to be followed by large deregula-
tion steps. In contrast to that, labour markets do not show a stable dynamic pattern 
across different specifications. 
Following the regulatory politics of the benchmark country (USA for non-
Europeans) or country group (EU for Europeans) is a significant and robust feature 
of deregulation in the case of financial and product markets. Cross-border links of 
regulatory politics are not significant for labour markets. In the case of trade, the 
equally significant and robust variable has the wrong sign (dropping the period fixed 
effects characterizing the trade regressions would leave the yardstick term insignifi-
cant). 
Turning now to the indicators linked to mobility, some different specifications are 
presented. Whereas the baseline specification (1) makes use of the summarizing 
principal component of trade and capital mobility, specifications (2)-(4) look sepa-
rately at each dimension. For financial markets and product markets there are sig-
nificant results with the expected sign for FDI (which in the case of financial regula-
tion also results in a significant principal component). The specific impact of FDI 
supports the argument from the theory of interest groups that national producer lob-
bies lose political influence by the entry of foreign companies with the consequence 
that large FDI speed up deregulation. 
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Whereas neither trade openness nor capital mobility are significant drivers of trade 
deregulation there is an interesting significance of trade openness in the labour mar-
ket regression: Larger trade openness is linked to more regulated labour markets. 
Decentralization is a significantly positive driver of deregulation in the case of fi-
nancial and labour markets but insignificant in the other cases. Not surprisingly due 
to the construction of the internal market in the period under consideration, EU 
member countries show a significantly larger speed of trade liberalization compared 
to other OECD countries. 
Further insights from the regressions are as follows: There are hardly any signs on 
mutual reinforcements between the different fields of regulation (with the exception 
of a positive impact of labour on trade deregulation). Thus, learning from deregula-
tion appears to be limited to the same regulatory field. 
The crisis hypothesis is supported for financial deregulation and growth crises: low 
levels of growth increase the likelihood of deregulative action. Interestingly, bad 
inflation data are not helpful for creating preconditions for structural change: infla-
tion is either insignificant or – as in the case of the financial market regressions – it 
has a negative sign. This is a result not unimportant for monetary policy: Allowing 
for high inflation rates does not appear to have the positive side-effect of speeding 
up deregulation. However, it should be added that this experience may be limited to 
the covered low inflation sample while cases of high inflation or even hyperinflation 
clearly contribute to a feeling of crisis and may then act as a deregulation catalyst. 
Finally, ideology has a significant impact mainly in the case of labour market regu-
lation. Here, significant differences exist between on the one hand left and right 
governments and on the other hand governments with a centre political orientation. 
Both left and right governments deregulate labour markets significantly more often 
than those associated with the political centre.  
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Table 3: Panel estimation financial deregulation (dependent variable: change financial 
regulation indicator) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 convergence, learning and yardstick 
level financial reg. (-1) 0.354*** 0.367*** 0.349*** 0.355*** 0.294*** 0.360*** 
square of lagged level (-1) -0.405*** -0.402*** -0.403*** -0.396*** -0.318*** -0.406*** 
yardstick (-1) 0.082** 0.102*** 0.081** 0.096*** 0.080** 0.091** 
 trade and capital mobility 
mobility princip. compo-
nent (-1) 
-0.012* - - - -0.008 -0.019* 
trade (-1) - 0.001 - - - - 
FDI (-1) - - 0.004*** - - - 
capital flows (-1) - - - 0.000 - - 
 decentralization/EU 
DRD3 0.002** 0.002* 0.002** 0.002** 0.001** 0.002** 
EU dummy 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.016 0.027* 0.017 
 regulatory interactions 
level trade reg. (-1) - - - - -0.029 - 
level product reg. (-1) - - - - 0.002 - 
level labour reg. (-1) - - - - 0.033 - 
mean regulation (-1) - - - - - -0.072 
 crisis proxies 
growth (-1) -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
inflation (-1) -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.003* -0.005** 
 Ideology dummy (divergence from centre) 
left (-1) 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.026* -0.001 
right (-1) 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.029** 0.001 
 
included fixed effects cross section cross section cross section cross section cross section cross section
nb. of observations 371 387 371 383 361 361 
R-squared 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.18 0.24 
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Table 4: Panel estimation product market deregulation (dependent variable: change prod-
uct market regulation indicator) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 convergence, learning and yardstick 
level product reg. (-1) 0.145*** 0.152*** 0.127*** 0.145*** 0.128** 0.107** 
square of lagged level (-1) -0.101** -0.103** -0.092* -0.105** -0.111* -0.080 
yardstick (-1) 0.148*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.131*** 0.116** 0.116*** 
 trade and capital mobility 
mobility  princip. compo-
nent (-1) 
-0.003 - - - -0.004 -0.004 
trade (-1) - -0.000 - - - - 
FDI (-1) - - 0.002* - - - 
capital flows (-1) - - - 0.000 - - 
 decentralization/EU 
DRD3 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.050 -0.000 
EU dummy 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 
 regulatory interactions 
level financial reg. (-1) - - - - 0.009 - 
level trade reg. (-1) - - - - 0.036 - 
level labour reg. (-1) - - - - 0.079 - 
mean regulation (-1) - - - - - 0.038 
 crisis proxies 
growth (-1) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.022 0.000 
inflation (-1) -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 
 ideology dummy (divergence from centre) 
ideology dummy: left (-1) -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
ideology dummy: right (-1) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 
included fixed effects cross section cross section cross section cross section cross section cross section
nb. of observations 354 370 354 366 352 352 
R-squared 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 
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Table 5: Panel estimation trade deregulation (dependent variable: change trade regulation 
indicator) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 convergence, learning and yardstick 
level trade reg. (-1) -0.895** -0.880** -0.902** -0.886** -0.941** -0.916** 
square of lagged level (-1) -0.040 -0.040 -0.042 -0.039 -0.038 -0.021 
yardstick (-1) -0.803*** -0.788*** -0.809*** -0.793*** -0.838*** -0.806*** 
 trade and capital mobility 
mobility princip. compo-
nent (-1) 
0.002 - - - 0.004 0.001 
trade (-1) - -0.000 - - - - 
FDI (-1) - - -0.001 - - - 
capital flows (-1) - - - 0.000 - - 
 decentralization/EU 
DRD3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 
EU dummy 0.018* 0.019* 0.019* 0.018* 0.018* 0.020** 
 regulatory interactions 
level financial reg. (-1) - - - - 0.006 - 
level product reg. (-1) - - - - -0.064** - 
level labour reg. (-1) - - - - 0.126** - 
mean regulation (-1) - - - - - 0.006 
 crisis proxies 
growth (-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
inflation (-1) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 
 ideology dummies (divergence from centre) 
ideology dummy: left (-1) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
ideology dummy: right (-1) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 
 
included fixed effects cross sec-
tion/ period 
cross sec-
tion/ period 
cross sec-
tion/ period 
cross sec-
tion/ period 
cross sec-
tion/ period 
cross sec-
tion/ period 
nb. of observations 371 387 371 383 361 361 
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.34 
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Table 6: Panel estimation labour market deregulation (dependent variable: change labour 
market regulation indicator) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 convergence, learning and yardstick 
level labour reg. (-1) -0.100 -0.302*** -0.104 -0.280** -0.127 -0.099 
square of lagged level (-1) -0.02 0.118* -0.069 0.118 -0.081 -0.057 
yardstick (-1) -0.028 -0.077* -0.027 -0.060 -0.074 -0.007 
 trade and capital mobility 
mobility princip. compo-
nent (-1) 
0.001 - - - 0.002 0.001 
trade (-1) - -0.000** - - - - 
FDI (-1) - - 0.000 - - - 
capital flows (-1) - - - -0.000 - - 
 decentralization/EU 
DRD3 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
EU dummy 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004 
 regulatory interactions 
level financial reg. (-1) - - - - 0.001 - 
level trade reg. (-1) - - - - -0.005 - 
level product reg. (-1) - - - - 0.003 - 
mean other regulation (-1) - - - - - -0.012 
 crisis proxies 
growth (-1) 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
inflation (-1) 0.000** 0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 ideology dummy (divergence from centre) 
ideology dummy: left (-1) 0.007** 0.005 0.007** 0.005 0.005 0.007** 
ideology dummy: right (-1) 0.011*** 0.009** 0.011*** 0.009** 0.009** 0.010*** 
 
fixed effects cross section 
/ period 
cross section cross section 
/ period 
cross section cross section cross section 
/ period 
nb. of observations 351 367 351 363 351 351 
R-squared 0.41 0.33 0.41 0.31 0.33 0.41 
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5 Conclusions 
The central question of this study asks for the regulatory leeway governments keep 
in the age of globalization. Our empirical study first of all shows that indeed the era 
of globalization is also a period of continuing (and converging) deregulation trends 
with regard to trade, financial and product markets of high-income industrial coun-
tries. At the same time, the econometric evidence shows that globalization in the 
narrow sense of trade openness and capital mobility has a rather limited impact as an 
immediate driver of deregulation. This means that national divergence from the 
global trends of deregulations is not clearly linked to the extent an economy is inte-
grated in global capital, goods and services markets. Hence, in a narrow definition, 
globalization as such leaves substantial leeway for specific regulatory approaches of 
the nation state. However, in a wider sense globalization definitions also comprise 
the easier flow of knowledge and information across borders resulting in more effec-
tive cross-border learning processes. The evidence hints to the empirical relevance 
of these learning aspects of globalization at least on fields like product and financial 
markets. Obviously, yardstick competition is of relevance and governments com-
manding over instruments of regulative redistribution are not able to ignore deregu-
lation processes beyond national borders. 
The notable exception from these insights is labour market regulation. With regard 
to job protection regulation and the generosity of unemployment benefits neither 
deregulation nor convergence can be detected in the covered period. In addition, 
regulation trends on the labour markets are only poorly explainable by the logic of 
convergence or cross-border learning. At the same time, government ideologies have 
a relatively large impact. Furthermore, there is some evidence that labour market 
regulation proceeds with increasing trade openness. With regard to the latter result 
the findings do not allow to discriminate between Rodrik’s compensation hypothesis 
and Vaubel’s alternative explanation: Voters may demand higher levels of job pro-
tection and unemployment benefits because more structural change and job market 
turnover are the necessary outcome of globalization (Rodrik’s view) or because 
globalization increases structural unemployment in countries with inflexible labour 
markets (Vaubel’s view). 
A further remarkable result is the catalyst role domestic decentralization appears to 
play for deregulation. This is a reminder about the continuing relevance of national 
constitutional structures for policy outcomes in a globalizing environment. 
Some final caveats must be added: The detected deregulation trends on many fields 
may obscure the fact that on fields not covered by available indicators - e.g. social or 
environmental policies - regulation may be progressing. David Henderson raises this 
point correctly in his subsequent comment. Furthermore, our empirical evidence is 
based on the period between 1975 up to the end of last century. More recent intensi-
fication of locational competition resulting for example from the enlargement of the 
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European Union towards Eastern Europe might have changed the situation since the 
nineties. Recent labour market reforms, e.g. in Germany, might hint to a new devel-
opment that, finally, labour markets regulation has to adjust to the intensified inter-
national competition. However, it remains to be seen whether these single deregula-
tion events result in a more general trend. 
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Appendix: Data Sources 
time series description source 
WEOFINANCIAL index financial sector regulation, details 
see text section 3 
Helbling et al. (2004) 
WEOLABOR index labor market regulation, details see 
text section 3 
Helbling et al. (2004) 
WEOPRODUCT index product market regulation, details 
see text section 3 
Helbling et al. (2004) 
WEOTRADE index trade liberalization, details see text 
section 3 
Helbling et al. (2004) 
DRD1 share of revenue assigned to regions Stegarescu (2004) 
DRD3 share of revenue under control of regions Stegarescu (2004) 
growth 
 
GDP growth World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
inflation 
 
inflation, consumer prices World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
FDI 
 
gross foreign direct investment in % GDP World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
trade 
 
sum of exports and imports of goods and 
services (in % GDP) 
World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
capital flows 
 
sum of the absolute values of direct, port-
folio, and other investment inflows and 
outflows recorded in the balance of pay-
ments financial account, excluding changes 
in the assets and liabilities of monetary 
authorities and general government (in % 
GDP).  
World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
foreign population 
 
foreign population (in %) World Bank: World Devel-
opment Indicators 
ideology dummy: left generated from chief executive’s party 
ideology variable 
Beck et al. (2001) 
ideology dummy: 
right 
generated from chief executive’s party 
ideology variable 
Beck et al. (2001) 
eumember dummy for EU membership  
 
 
 
 
